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Propositional Pleasures in Plato’s Philebus* 
 
Fernando Muniz 
 
Abstract This paper evaluates the arguments presented regarding the interpretation of 
false pleasures in Plato’s Philebus during the past 50 years. As the central axis of the 
debate is the concept of propositional attitude, I will tell the story of the propositional 
interpretation of the passage to show how and why it was constructed to become 
seemingly obvious, irrefutable, and even Platonic in its origin. Besides this, the paper 
raises the following problems for the propositional interpretation: (i) if it has textual basis 
and (ii) if it is necessary to understand the passage or if it is an obstacle and should be 
abandoned so that the Platonic text could be read in a non-anachronistic way.  
 
Introduction 
 In 1959, J. Gosling published his seminal “False Pleasures: Philebus 35c-41b,” 
triggering an endless debate on a subject that had seemed sterile: the issue of false 
pleasures. Plato somewhat anticipated, not without some pleasure, this controversy when 
he makes Socrates say to Protarchus, at 36d, in the introduction of this theme in the 
dialogue: “We are starting a discussion that will be anything but small.” This prediction, 
however, was not fully met until Gosling´s article came into the hands of his peers. But 
what would have been the substance injected by Gosling into Plato’s text to bring to life a 
subject that had been so well buried? It was a new drug that makes the Platonic text 
speak, not in that obscure language that his critics disliked, but in a way so clear and 
simple that we could swear it came from a text of Gilbert Ryle11 or Bernard Williams.  
After 50 years of intense controversy about false pleasures in the Philebus, maybe 
now we can evaluate some arguments in this debate. As the discussion has taken as 
                                                
* For research support, I thank CAPES for the grant I received to do post-doctoral research at 
Brown University. I would also like to thank David Konstan and Mary-Louise Gill for their 
constructive feedback during our discussions, as well as Boris Nikolsky and George 
Rudebusch. 
1 G. E.M. Anscombe: “The concept of pleasure (...) had hardly seemed a problematic one at all 
to modern philosophers until Ryle reintroduced it as a topic a year or two ago.” (1957, p.76). 
For discussion see Bravo (1995).  
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central axis the concept of propositional attitude, I will tell the story of propositional 
interpretation of the passage to show how and why it was constructed to become obvious, 
irrefutable, and even Platonic in its origin. This article raises some questions about the 
propositional interpretation: (i) if it has textual basis, (ii) if it answers the fundamental 
questions raised by the dialogue, and finally (iii) if it is necessary to understand the 
passage or if it is an obstacle and should be abandoned so that the Platonic text could be 
read in a non-anachronistic way.  
 
Hanging a Giorgione  
In his article, Gosling presented a summary of what he considered to be a 
superficial and distorted reading of the passage.2 His intention was to correct the distorted 
view and at the same time build an alternative interpretation. In the summary of the 
Distorted View (DV) given by Gosling, Socrates examines anticipatory pleasures and 
suggests, “to the surprise of Protarchus that they can be true or false (...) and in the end he 
talks as though he had won an argument over Protarchus” (p. 45). But what Socrates is 
saying, according to DV, is that “sometimes we make prognostications, and in 
accordance with these prognostications we are delighted or depressed; but sometimes our 
prognostication is false, and in such a case, while it is true that our delight is genuine, and 
that strictly only the prognostication can be called false, still, we may loosely be allowed 
to call the delight false also, because it depends on and is closely bound up with the 
prognostication” (p. 45). DV separates the delight, the feeling of pleasure, and the 
enjoyment from the opinion and prognostication and, in no case, can admit what Gosling 
thinks that Plato is seriously doing, i.e., “suggesting that falsity is an attribute of 
pleasure” (p. 45).  
For Gosling, “Plato was aware of the oddity of calling pleasures false (...) It is 
made clear that what he is holding is something which at first sight seems decidedly 
strange” (p. 46). But he is trying to reveal an important truth about pleasure that 
                                                
2 The question of false pleasure in the Philebus involves a typology. Socrates presents three 
kinds of false pleasures, but, as contemporary commentators focused their attention especially 
on this first kind—the so-called anticipatory pleasure—I’m going to restrict the subject of this 
paper to it. 
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“Protarchus’ position obscures” (p. 46). If DV is Protarchus’ view, we could ask why 
Plato´s text produces this distortion of his own perspective. Gosling doesn´t explain why, 
but as we know that Gosling takes Protarchus as a common man3, we can suppose that 
the average reader is led almost spontaneously to agree with him and ignore the more 
philosophical point of view Socrates is trying to establish. It is that non-critical sense that 
Gosling will strongly attack. His attack targets basically one point: Socrates, confronted 
with a common-sense position that takes pleasure as completely separate from opinion, 
proposes to consider the possibility of an “intimate connection” between pleasure and 
falsity and reveal an “important truth” about pleasure obscured by ordinary thought. 
Gosling´s strategy will succeed only if he clearly demonstrates the existence of the 
“intimate connection” that he supposes that Socrates is proposing.4 Given his objective, 
Gosling will try to show that pleasure “may be false in a more genuine way than this 
account [DV] recognizes” (p. 46).  
The two views on pleasure that Gosling identifies in the text were, in fact, well 
known at the time he published his article. In the historical background of the discussion 
on pleasure, they are contrasted in Ryle’s reflections on the subject.5 In 1959, the same 
year of Gosling´s article, Bernard Williams published his equally famous article 
“Pleasure and Belief” and here too the two positions are opposed. More interestingly, in 
Bernard William’s article he is seeking to deepen the notion of pleasure as “one species 
or mode of attention” in a new way that “Ryle does not discuss, [namely,] what the 
relation is of attention to its objects, in particular to objects which are mistakenly believed 
to exist” (p. 71). The Philebus is without doubt the inspiration of Williams´s article, and 
many aspects of it echo Gosling’s text. Both articles can be read as complementary to the 
                                                
3 Cf. “the hesitation of the common man, i.e., Protarchus” p. 53. The idea that Protarchus is a 
common man without a theoretical position became a consensus among interpreters. See Frede 
(1985): “That pleasures are events with propositional content would be hard (and is hard) to 
explain to anyone who is not trained in philosophy and does not have the appropriate 
vocabulary at his disposition” (p. 174). 
4 “Far from accepting Protarchus’s view, Socrates is persisting in holding to some more 
intimate connection between pleasure and falsity” (p. 46). Decades later, Gosling’s “intimate 
connection” is still characterizing Socrates’ position to Propositionalists. See Frede (1993): 
“…his [Protarchus’s] epiphenomenal view that pleasure, the feeling, is separable from its 
object. This is what Socrates now attacks by establishing an intimate connection between 
pleasure and judgment” (p. 41 n.1).  
5 Ryle (1949 e 1954). 
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understanding of the insertion of Philebus into the context of a large discussion on 
pleasure opened by Ryle. Gosling never mentions directly the theoretical background of 
his interpretation, but a mere look at Williams´s paper gives us the clues to the 
presuppositions of Gosling’s view. In the example that opens Williams´s article, the 
Philebus is the immediate reference: “I may be pleased because (as I suppose) I have 
inherited a fortune, when I have not” (p. 57). This example inspired by Plato will take us 
straight to the problem of anticipatory pleasure and to the relation between pleasure and 
opinion (“our present concern here is with the problems of belief and knowledge in 
relation to pleasure” p. 68). That’s the question of Williams’s article. And answering the 
question, Williams introduces a decisive distinction for the future of the interpretation of 
Plato’s passage on false pleasures6. It is presented in relation to a painting by Giorgione7:  
(GI) “I may be pleased at x, but say that I am pleased at y because I falsely believe 
that x is y;”  
(GII) “I may take pleasure in, or be pleased by, x which I mistakenly think is y, 
where x’s supposedly being y is the basis of my pleasure. Thus, I may be 
pleased by this supposed Giorgione as being a Giorgione.” (p. 66)  
 
In the first case, the falsities of opinion don’t affect my pleasure, “because x’s 
being y is no element in my pleasure. Thus, I may be pleased by this picture, as a picture, 
and say that I am pleased by this Giorgione, when the picture is not a Giorgione.” In the 
second case, the situation is completely different because the “discovery of the truth will 
mean (...) the end of pleasure - at least, of that pleasure” (p.66). This would be similar to 
the case of “my supposed inheritance of a fortune,” which means “be pleased at 
something that does not exist at all” (p. 66).  
                                                
6 Williams (1959), nonetheless, never attributes the distinction of pleasure of anticipation and 
the anticipation of pleasure to Plato. On the contrary, he says, p. 69, quoting Philebus 39d seq.: 
“for the pleasures of anticipation consist in the anticipation of pleasure.”  
7 The mysterious Renaissance painter Giorgione, also known as Barbarelli, was famous for his 
gifts. There is uncertainty about the authenticity of works attributed to him. Giorgione made his 
first appearance in a philosophical scene in Quine’s book O Sentido da Nova Lógica, published 
in Brazil in 1944 and written in Portuguese. Bernard William’s distinction is clearly inspired 
by Quine’s example. 
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Now, we can return to Gosling’s alternative account. As we have said, he was 
searching for the “intimate connection” between pleasure and belief. And now we can say 
that this search is for the Giorgione II — that is, a case like Gosling’s sentence GII above 
— in the text. Only a Giorgione II could show the logical necessity that makes pleasure 
depend on opinion. This process that I call “hanging a Giorgione” is the fabrication in the 
Platonic text of a distinction that we cannot find explicitly in it. That´s what Gosling was 
looking for when he discusses “what Plato is getting at in the analogy of pleasure and 
belief.” Socrates’ investigation begins with an analogy. It is easy to see that the analogy is 
based on Protarchus’ admission that beliefs are true or false. That’s why Socrates is going 
to construct a parallel to transpose the condition of belief to pleasure. The analogy 
between pleasure (hedone) and belief (doxa) can be schematically put in the following 
way:  
1. There is such a thing as believing (doxazein). 37a2-3  
1´. There is such a thing as enjoying (hedeisthai). 37a5  
2. [In cases of believing] there is something believed (to doxazomenon). 37a7  
2´. [In cases of enjoying] there is something that the one enjoying enjoys (ho(i) to 
hedomenon hedetai) . 37a9  
3. The thing that believes, whether it believes rightly (orthos) or not, does not ever 
nullify the fact of believing. 37a11-12  
3´. The thing that enjoys, whether it enjoys rightly (orthos) or not, will never nullify 
the fact of enjoying. 37b2-3 [these symmetrical relations are going to permit a 
perfect transposition at 4 and 5]  
4. If the thing believed (to doxazomenon) is mistaken (hamartanomenon) then the 
belief that makes that mistake is not right (orthen). 37e1-3  
5. If a pain or pleasure is mistaken (hamartanousan) in what it is pleased or pained 
about, it would be impossible to call it right. 37e5- [But Protarchus perceived the 
trap and says at 6...]  
6. Protarchus: If the pleasure can be mistaken (hamartesetai)...[at 8],  
[At this point Socrates tries to associate pleasure and opinion]  
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7. Socrates: Pleasure and pain often come with true and with false belief . 37b9-10 
[Protarchus accepts the association but denies the identification...]  
8. Protarchus: In those cases, what we can call false is only opinion. Nobody can call 
pleasure itself false. 38a1  
 
Gosling based his analysis of this analogy upon two words: orthotes (“rightness”) 
and harmartanein (“to miss the mark”). Established by these key words, this similarity 
places pleasure and opinion in a symmetrical relation. The strategy was supposed to work 
with Protarchus, but failed to convince him. But, according to Gosling, what Plato is 
trying to get with the analogy is “that anticipatory pleasure is taken (...) from supposed 
information about the pleasures to come” and that it is “the correctness of this 
information that is directly responsible for the “truth” and “falsity” of the pleasure” (p. 
49). If Protarchus had accepted this, he would have accepted a logical dependence 
between the pleasure and opinion like that of Giorgione II, the “intimate connection.” But 
Protarchus introduces an asymmetry in the analogy (38a1). He rejects the application of 
falsity to pleasures, so that what Socrates has to investigate now is the asymmetry 
proposed by Protarchus: opinion may be true or false, but genuine pleasure can only be 
true (p. 51).  
Thus Socrates introduces another analogy: between the soul and a book. And we 
move from belief to picture. In the second analogy, after describing a perceptual situation 
when somebody sees something appearing at a distance and tries to identify it, Socrates 
compares the soul to a book: The combination of memory and sense experience writes 
sentences in the soul; sometimes what they write is true, sometimes false. Besides the 
writer, there is also a painter “who paints pictures in accordance with the logos” and that 
which is painted may be past, present and future. The pictures take place “in the absence 
of direct experience which is the subject of logos” (p. 51).  
This ‘painting’ analogy is decisive to Gosling’s reading. The “zoographos 
[painter] passage,” he says, is not “irrelevant.” Plato is saying “a little more than” the DV 
reading. But what does Gosling see as essential to anticipatory pleasure in the passage? 
With this analogy, Socrates obtains the admission of Protarchus that pictures of false 
beliefs are themselves false. But why does the analogy of soul to book lead Protarchus to 
accept that some pleasures are false? Gosling’s answer is based on a supposed ambiguity. 
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As the truth or falsity of the pictures depends on the logoi of which they are pictures, 
Gosling supposes that for Plato “the pleasure and the picture are run together, and the 
picture of a pleasure and the pleasure of a picture taken to be the same.” Gosling thinks 
that Protarchus accepts this conflation. In sum, “anticipatory pleasures can be said to be 
correct or incorrect, right or mistaken, because they are in fact pictures, and pictures, 
when based on beliefs, can be incorrect or mistaken, and so false.” When the relation 
between the pictures and beliefs is explained, Protarchus could accept the truth or falsity 
of the pictures. “Belief infects the pictures”, as Socrates says, with their condition. Since 
they are based on beliefs, their truth or falsity is derivative.  
But I say this derivative sense threatens Gosling’s project of demonstrating an 
“intimate connection” between pleasure and belief. The very idea of ‘infection,’ 
suggested by Socrates, assumes their separability. In truth, Gosling seems to end up 
agreeing with what he thinks was the original thesis of Protarchus: falsity cannot be 
attributed to an episode of pleasure. For Gosling, it is meaningless to say, “I falsely 
enjoyed a glass of beer.” You can attribute falsity to a belief, but belief is not sufficient to 
produce pleasure. ‘So long as one refrains from picturing anything to oneself, one may 
have the belief without any pleasure at all.” So, the difference between belief and picture 
should explain how pleasures are possible. The question now becomes: what do pictures 
do that makes pleasure possible? For, in Gosling’s view, pleasures derive their falsity 
from false beliefs, but they do so via the fact that they are pictures” (Dybikovski, p. 150). 
Correctly, Gosling places all of the weight in his paper upon the imagination and the 
images that it constructs. And his question then becomes: how does one move from the 
truth or falsity of the images to the truth or falsity of the pleasures?  
What Gosling saw as ambiguities, his readers, such as Kenny and Dybikowski, 
saw as an accusation of confusion on the part of Plato. In his reply to Kenny, Gosling 
says, “This is far from the case. My point is that Plato does not make a distinction 
between the pleasure to be got from a picture and the picture. The painted pleasure, as the 
painted Socrates, is the picture, not the subject. Whether this is confusion or not I do not 
know. It seems to me that only if he conflates the two has he shown that such pleasures 
can be false.” At the end, Gosling shows the aporia behind the conflation: “Whether or 
not he makes this conflation is important (...) For if he does not make it, he must 
distinguish between taking pleasure in the picture and having the picture. But if this is so, 
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he should have seen that Protarchus could have repeated his earlier objection about belief: 
just the belief, not the pleasure, is false, so now it is not the pleasure that has been shown 
to be false, but the picture” (p.43-4). In an appendix to The Greeks on Pleasure (1982), 
Gosling and Taylor made a revision of the interpretations on false pleasures. They did not 
find any substantial difference between Gosling´s account and Kenny’s or Dybikowski’s. 
They all agree that the conflation is the central problem of the passage.8 Gosling (only 
with Taylor in The Greeks on Pleasure!), Kenny, and Dybikowski agree that some kind 
of mistake in Socrates’ argument prevents a clear reading. While Gosling and Kenny see 
the argument as turning on a conflation of (...) picture and picturing9, Dybikowski makes 
it depend on a conflation of picture and object depicted. The interpretive problem turns 
out to be how Socrates proceeds from the truth or falsity of pictures to the truth or falsity 
of pleasures10.  
In the conclusion of his article, Dybikowiski made a special contribution to the 
Propositional Interpretation. He termed the question about the plausibility of Plato´s 
                                                
 8“While Gosling and Kenny (1960) see the argument as turning on a conflation of... picture 
and picturing, Dybikowski (1970) makes it depend on a conflation of picture and object 
depicted, together with a further conflation of the object depicted (a pleasure) with the pleasure 
of depicting that object (p. 440). According to Kenny (1960), Protarchus is convinced by an 
argument that takes the truth in another sense: “Bad men enjoy largely false pleasures, while 
good men enjoy true ones.” Protarchus would be induced to admit that a pleasure may be false 
by considering the case of false belief held by a wicked man who is picturing a future pleasure” 
(p. 9). False belief here should not be understood in terms of a misclassification of an event [to 
receive or not a fortune]. In the case of the man looking forward to receiving a fortune, the 
false belief is not the belief that he will get the money” but it “is the belief that he will enjoy 
these activities.” 
9 According to Kenny (1960), Protarchus is convinced by an argument that takes the truth in 
another sense: “Bad men enjoy largely false pleasures, while good men enjoy true ones.” 
Protarchus would be induced to admit that a pleasure may be false by considering the case of 
false belief held by a wicked man who is picturing a future pleasure” (p. 9). False belief here 
should not be understood in terms of a misclassification of an event [to receive or not a 
fortune]. In the case of the man looking forward to receiving a fortune, the false belief is not 
the belief that he will get the money” but it “is the belief that he will enjoy these activities.” 
10 About the crucial passage on imagination, Dybikovski (1970) recognizes that if we take what 
Plato says in the passage literally at 40b6-7, he is giving false pleasures painted. Thus, the 
falsity is attributed to the anticipated pleasures, and not, as expected, the pleasures of 
anticipation. Socrates has therefore made a mistake, “instead of claiming that the pleasure 
taken in the picture is false, he makes the claim about the pictured pleasure.” (p. 165) But the 
mistake permits Protarchus to agree with the conclusion: he accepts that the pleasure is false 
because it has already accepted that the pleasures of evil are false paintings. “But neither 
Socrates nor Protarchus see that a very different claim has to be established in order to show 
that there can be false pleasures.” (p. 165) 
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defending anachronistic positions irrelevant. Although he concludes that Plato is 
mistaken, he thinks that Plato was “moving in fresh directions” in his account of pleasure 
and belief, so that “this account need not carry any logical commitment to Plato´s general 
theory of pleasure and that, in consequence, it can be detached from it, whether Plato 
would be willing to follow such a lead or not”11. It all depends on our contemporary 
philosophical interest. “For it is not the general theory of pleasure which is of interest to 
the modern philosopher so much as Plato´s acknowledgement that belief plays an 
important role in the analysis of the concept of pleasure and his use of it to map a relation 
between pleasure and desire.” In sum: if we could apply the Giorgione distinction to 
Plato´s passage, we don´t need to connect the passage with Plato´s philosophy anymore, 
because we can suppose that he was moving in fresh directions. Coincidently and 
fortunately, as we are going to see, he was moving to meet—and please—our own 
expectations...  
One significant point of Gosling - this time co-authoring a book with Taylor - in 
The Greeks on Pleasure, is a change of vocabulary in relation to Gosling’s first articles. 
Gosling and Taylor describe what is called false in terms either of “some enjoyment” or 
“a propositional attitude.” A propositional attitude is characterized by the expression  
“... is pleased that p.” For them, “if this is what Plato is talking about and not enjoyments, 
then we can readily see how falsity of the sort attributed to beliefs could be attributed to 
such an attitude” (p. 429). Gosling and Taylor recorded that, at that time, 1982, a 
tendency in the analysis of the passage was gaining ground, namely, the propositional 
interpretation of false pleasures. This new trend reads Gosling (1982) against Gosling 
(1959), eliminating “ambiguities,” “conflations,” “errors,” and “mistakes” which, in one 
way or another, he and his followers attributed to Plato. Accepting Dybikowski´s 
suggestion of detaching the passage of Platonic account of pleasure and showing in the 
text devices that make possible the idea that Plato was aware of the distinction of 
                                                
11 This idea is behind Frede’s conviction is that Plato thought that “a revision of the ontology of 
pleasures should be made; and I see this as one of the main objectives in the Philebus” (1985, 
p. 176). The “fresh start” of Dybikovsky became “fresh ground” to Frede (“The Philebus thus 
breaks fresh ground” (p. 161)) or even “fresh start” (“Plato makes a fresh start in the 
Philebus”(p. 161)). The revision in question is a revision of “the concept of true and false 
pleasures in Rep. IX” and of the doctrine of “the degrees of reality” to which it is tied. But what 
is missing in Rep. IX? Frede has no difficult in answering: “the propositional sense of true” 
(1985, p. 160-1). 
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Williams’s Giorgione, the interpretation in terms of Propositional Pleasure thereby 
establishes the canonical interpretation of the false pleasures.  
This tendency started in 1962. Shortly after the publication of the articles of 
Gosling and Bernard Williams, Thalberg publishes an enthusiastic “interpretation” of the 
passage, although far away from the text of the Philebus. There, his aim was to “explain 
Plato’s view of false pleasure and answer the more obvious objections to it (...) and (...) 
argue that his strange doctrine illuminates the neglected propositional aspect of the 
moods we characterize as “enjoyment,” “amusement,” or “pleasure.” His “presumptions” 
are based, not surprisingly, on Ryle. “Professor Ryle,” he says, “has demonstrated that 
these nouns and their corresponding verbs, do not apply to sensations or any kind of 
neural process” (p. 65). But Ryle, according to Thalberg, left “untouched the residue of 
fascinating expressions” (Ex. “John is pleased [or thrilled, or overjoyed, or delighted, or 
satisfied, or content] that his enemies died of a heart attack”). In the Philebus, Thalberg 
found “an illuminating rapprochement between this family of phrases about pleasure (the 
seeming non-cognitive state) and a family of cognitive- sounding idioms: ‘anticipating 
(expecting, fearing, hoping, believing) that’.” According to Thalberg, the Platonic thesis 
“is a simple one”: “When Jones is convinced that he is (or will be) the winner of the Irish 
Sweepstakes, but his number doesn’t come up, we call his belief false. Therefore, if Jones 
declared, ‘I’m delighted that I won,’ why shouldn’t we say that he was mistaken - that his 
pleasure was false?” (p. 66) For Thalberg, in Protarchus’s “analysis” of the relation 
between pleasure and belief, “it sounds as if the two elements of such a mental state were 
completely separable, like the melting of a piece of wax and the heating that precedes it” 
(p. 67). Thalberg attributes to Protarchus a causal connection between belief and pleasure. 
“But surely, he says, there is no logical connection between believing and being delighted 
that one has triumphed in the Sweepstakes”. As we can see, Thalberg is still looking for 
the “intimate connection” between pleasure and belief and thought that he found this 
“inseparability” in a new concept implicit in Williams´s distinction. Thalberg concludes 
what he called a “defense of Plato’s view” with the emphatic declaration: “Finally: I 
intend to classify pleasure and similar states as ‘propositional attitudes.’” (p. 73)12.  
                                                
12 Thalberg explicitly talks about Quine´s objections to the concept of propositional attitudes: “I 
admit, he says, the difficulties that Professor Quine ascribes to the analysis of propositional 
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Despite the vagueness of Thalberg’s interpretation and the striking absence of 
Plato´s text in it, it is clear that his interest is focused on a Rylean analysis of those 
“fascinating expressions”. The Philebus is just an excuse for it. Thalberg gave an over-
interpretation of the text so that he could get where he wanted to go. Someone needed to 
try connecting this over-interpretation to the text. That’s what Terry Penner did.  
In 1970, in the same issue of the journal that published Dybikowski´s article, we 
find “False Anticipatory Pleasures, Philebus 36a3-41A6” by Penner. This article 
establishes definitely the propositional interpretation of false pleasures as a canonical 
interpretation of the passage. Although based on Gosling´s reading, and motivated by 
Thalberg’s blind optimism, Penner focuses his interpretation upon Williams and his 
Giorgione distinction. He indicates “very roughly” how he is going to use the distinction:  
This Giorgione pleases me (this is ambiguous, since it may be read as either of the 
following)  
This painting is a Giorgione, and it pleases me  
This painting is a Giorgione and it, being a Giorgione, pleases me. (167-8)  
This difference Williams points to is that the painting being a Giorgione is “within 
the scope of my being pleased when ‘this Giorgione’ is read as in (3), whereas when read 
as in (2) it does little more than help me pin an identificatory tag upon the painting which 
is the object of my pleasure.” Penner thinks that the fact that Plato speaks of “certain 
beliefs ‘infecting’ certain ‘pleasures’ seems prima facie grounds for saying that it was 
indeed this distinction that Plato was after in his discussion of false anticipatory 
pleasures” (p. 167, my italics)13. Penner nonetheless recognizes that just to say that Plato 
was after this distinction is not enough to reach an interpretation of the passage. He thinks 
that “he can do better than this” and “better than any of those recent treatments of the 
passage which have been aware of the distinction of Williams” (p. 167), Gosling 
                                                                                                                                            
attitudes. A statement describing a pleasure that is a propositional attitude – for instance, “Mr 
Jones is pleased that Mr Jones’s horse won the handicap’ – is referentially opaque…” (p. 73) 
13 For convenience, Frede (1985, p.166) mistranslated “anepimplasan” in 42a10, by “affect” 
and criticizes the correct translation by “infect”: “Gosling (…) and Kenny (…) translate it by 
“infect”, but that might be too weak because this may just means that they have an impact 
while a merger seems rather to be what Plato has in mind.” Her translation by “affect” (1993, 
ad loc) is an attempt to eliminate the obvious difficulty that the text offers to propositional 
interpretation.  
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included. What is necessary to do that is “demonstrating Plato´s insights.” The better 
thing that Penner could do was to find proofs in the text that Plato is not only aware of the 
distinctions but is applying them. Metaphorically speaking, he aimed to find a nail to 
hang his Giorgione. And was he successful? Penner supposes that some grammatical 
elements (prepositions and uses of the dative case) give practical evidence that Plato is 
applying the distinction14. Using these grammatical elements, Plato is “urging, which 
nowadays recognize in our talk of ‘propositional attitudes’.” To make his ‘machinery’ 
work15, beyond identifying all these ‘devices’16, Penner introduces some replacements. 
First Penner replaces the Giorgione example, because “to Williams, objects of pleasure 
are paintings hanging in a gallery. But for Plato, the objects of pleasure are possible 
future state of affairs -- oneself getting a lot of gold and many pleasures as a 
consequence.”...”So let us alter William’s example to make it more like Plato’s.” (p. 168) 
Second, he replaced Plato´s example because, as is evident, it does not meet the needs of 
Penner, which is to find an example that perfectly fits the distinction of Williams. And so 
this time we are going out not to a sweepstakes with Thalberg, but to a skate race with 
Penner. There, he asks us to consider the following: “I am skating in a race and believe 
that I am going to win the race. Then there are at least the following two cases of 
pleasure:  
(4) I’m going to win the race and I am taking pleasure in (enjoying) skating.  
(5) I’m going to win the race and because I am going to win the race I am pleased. 
Sentence (5) is equivalent to:  
(6) I am going to win the race and I am pleased that I am going to win the race. (p. 
168) 
Penner can, at last, say that “the objects of pleasures here are not the activity of 
skating but the possible future state of affairs or as I shall call it the ‘proposition’ that I 
am going to win the race.” But where does Plato demonstrate awareness of Williams’s 
                                                
14 About the criticism of the use of English grammar as model to propositional attitude see 
Merricks (2009, p. 231): “Apparently, the contingent and conventional Grammar of English 
does not dictate the metaphysics of how a thinking agent is related to propositions” 
15 “Machinery” is the word that Penner (1970a) applies to interpretations before his.  
16 Penner (1970a, p. 175): “All of these devices are natural ones for the relation I have 
characterized as ‘phi-ing in p’.” 
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distinction? According to Penner, “It is in the recognition of the analogy between being 
pleased-that and believing-that that Plato exhibits his awareness of Williams´s 
distinction.” (p. 171) After replacements and adjustments, Penner could affirm that for 
Plato pleasure is a kind of perceiving (but only “if the perceiving is a perceiving that 
something is the case”). This perceiving is just “a way of saying that ‘being pleased that... 
[and therefore] perceiving is a propositional attitude”17 (p. 171). However artificial and 
inaccurate we might now judge Penner’s essay, as a historical fact it established the 
propositional interpretation as a dogma.  
 
Erasing a Giorgione18 
Gosling and Taylor recognize the novelty of Penner’s reading, establishing Plato 
as the creator of the concept of propositional pleasures. In Penner’s words (p. 171), “Plato 
was the first person in the history of philosophy to see this” [the concept of propositional 
attitudes]. They recognize that the identification of the intimate connection with 
propositional attitudes was a contribution to contemporary thought on the subject. But, 
for Gosling and Taylor, “if Penner´s thesis is to come to more than that,” i.e., make more 
than a contribution to contemporary thought, he “has to show that Plato distinguishes 
between (...) being pleased that p on the one hand and enjoying the thought of p on the 
other. But not only does Plato´s language nowhere suggest a grasp of this very subtle 
                                                
17 Penner (1970a) explains why Protarchus was convinced by Socrates’ argument on the 
grounds that Socrates re-directed “Protarchus’ attention to the idea of taking pleasure in the 
belief, i.e., in the proposition. But in a footnote (p. 176 n.12) Penner revealed the old difficulty 
to sustain this position: “There is a difficulty as to just where Protarchus concedes that pleasure 
can be false. It might seem that he does so at 40b8-c3. However, on any reading, 40 b8-c3… is 
odd, for the hedonai (…) ezographemenai that are called false are not the pleasures of 
anticipation... but the pleasures being anticipated, the pleasures painted in the soul... So, I agree 
with Kenny (op. cit. 52) that 40b6-7 must be elliptical for something like: ‘And pictured 
pleasures are no less present to the evil, but [these pictures] are false.’” 
18In 1953, the young avant-garde painter Rauschenberg asked the great painter of that time, De 
Kooning, for a drawing so that Rauschenberg might erase it as an act of performance art. De 
Kooning understood the symbolic importance of the act and gave him a masterpiece for 
destruction. The Erased De Kooning Drawing was exhibited, to public scandal, in the same 
year. Hence the title of this section, although my purpose is different; since the Platonic 
Giorgione is fake and my intention is not transgressive but just philosophical.  
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distinction; even more damaging to Penner´s thesis is the fact that Plato’s example ...is 
clearly of someone enjoying the picturing of future pleasure” (p. 441).19  
Despite Gosling and Taylor’s reservations, forty years after Penner´s article, we 
read, in a 2009 paper by Matthew Evans, Penner’s assumptions in a dogmatic form: 
“Anyone who wants to base an account of false pleasures on an analogy between pleasure 
and belief–as Plato clearly does–is thereby committed to the view that at least some 
pleasures are attitudes.”20 In a footnote, Evans says that “most commentators are in 
agreement on this point (Penner, Frede, Irwin, Delcomminette, Harte, Russell)” while 
mentioning Gosling and Taylor as a “noteworthy dissent.”  
The dogma of propositional pleasure is either not questioned or, when it is, as 
Dorothea Frede does, is only done so rhetorically. “Should we ourselves, who are more 
used to such philosophical monsters as ‘propositional attitudes,’ agree to the argument´s 
presuppositions? Does it make sense to call some logoi pleasures? Are not feelings one 
thing and propositions another?” – she asks (1993, xlvii). But Frede´s question is not a 
real question. She accepted the idea of propositional pleasure without discussion or even 
a clear definition of it. According to her, “pleasure is a ‘propositional attitude’ if not 
“things” are enjoyed, such as an apple or a glass of wine (...) Snow-White´s evil 
stepmother, e.g., enjoys not her own beauty but the alleged fact ‘that she is the fairest of 
all’. The content of the pleasure consists in a statement or ‘proposition,’ as philosophers 
prefer to call it.”21  
“As philosophers prefer to call it” or as “we nowadays recognize in our talk of 
‘propositional attitudes’”22 is the usual justification for the use of the concept. But it is 
                                                
19 Gosling and Taylor (1982 p. 441): “The vocabulary of ‘experiencing pleasures in advance 
etc., noticed above is appropriate to the description of anticipatory enjoyment, but 
inappropriate to the description of simply being pleased that one will have some future 
enjoyment, which may come to no more than this, that one believes that one will have the 
enjoyment and regards the fact that one will have it as something to be welcomed.” 
20 Evans (2009), 93-4. 21 Frede (1993), xlv, n. 2. 
21 Frede (1993), xlv, n.2.  
22 Penner (1970a), p. 175. When Frede says “Philosophers” and Penner “our talk of 
propositional attitudes,” they have in mind Fregean semantics. Although Penner says in his 
paper that it was “by noticing Plato’s use of these words [“belief”, “with”, “in”] that I came to 
the philosophical points,” it is clear enough that he found in Plato what he knew to look for 
from the Fregean tradition. See note 4, p. 168, where he says: “In an unpublished paper on 
quantification into intentional context, I explore the significance of this distinction [the 
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not so obvious that Snow White´s evil stepmother could take pleasure from propositions. 
Moreover, if belief in this case is a necessary condition to pleasure, it is not sufficient to 
produce pleasure. Belief cannot explain pleasure. The same belief or proposition can 
produce pain, pleasure, or nothing at all. That´s why Frede could very well imagine a 
situation in which Snow White´s stepmother would have pain in believing “that she (and 
not her beloved and ugly stepdaughter) is the fairest of all.”  
If commentators had given more attention to what philosophers nowadays discuss 
about the subject, perhaps this classification of pleasure as a propositional attitude would 
become less obvious. Let’s take a definition that fits the commentators’ general view: 
“Propositions are what we believe, disbelieve, or suspend judgment about. When you fear 
that you will fail, or hope that you will succeed, when you venture a guess or feel certain 
about something, the object of your attitude is a proposition.”23 But as A. N. Prior has 
already pointed out call long ago, “it is (...) clear that we do not fear, desire, etc., 
sentences. Or at least the objects of such fears, hopes, etc., as are expressed by saying that 
someone fears that so-and-so, hopes that so-and-so, desires that so-and-so, are not 
sentences.”24 There is recent strong criticism of the idea that desire and fears are 
propositional attitudes25. One conclusion of these discussions is “that when the content of 
a fear or desire cannot be fully expressed by using a that-clause, that fear or desire is not a 
propositional attitude” 26. More incisively, Trenton Merricks does not deny the existence 
of propositional attitudes as beliefs, but affirms that “fears and desires are never 
propositional attitudes, not even when we can fully express the content of the relevant 
fear or desire by using a that-clause” (p. 209). 27 “We do not fear propositions, not as 
                                                                                                                                            
Giorgione distinction] for developments of Fregean semantics and the Fregean theory of 
existence and the existential quantifier,” and note 6, pp. 169-170, where he mentions his article 
“Verbs and the Identity of Actions” (which deals with process-product ambiguities) in a 
volume on Ryle (1970b).  
23 Salmon, and Soames, quoted by Merricks (2009), p. 207. 
24 Prior, A. N. (1971) p.14-15.. 26 Merricks (2009), p. 209. 
25 See Montagne (2007), and Brewer (2006). 
26 Merricks (2009), p. 209. 
27 In fact, Merrick uses a more complex definition of propositional attitude than that “whose 
content can be fully expressed by a that-clause”. For him, it is “an attitude that is analyzed as – 
or reduced to – a relation between an agent and a proposition. For example, my desiring that 
my children flourish is a propositional attitude, in my sense, if and only if my desiring this is 
analyzed as, or reduced to, my standing in a certain relation to a particular proposition” (p. 
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some fear dogs”, he says (p. 213). It would be pathological for anyone to fear a 
proposition “as he fears that a tiger will attack him.” Proposition are abstract objects and 
“no one should really fear any abstract object (...) Jones does not fear any proposition in 
the way that he fears that a tiger will attack him” (p. 214).  
But let’s ignore the problems and suppose with Frede that propositional pleasure 
is a non-problematic concept. Let’s suppose that “everything is, ‘logically speaking,’ 
above board” and take seriously another rhetorical question of Frede’s: “Why does 
Socrates not explain in a more direct way that some pleasures consist in logoi or 
pictures?” Frede asks herself this relevant question but offers us a disappointing answer: 
“His reasons are mainly psychological.” 28 In reality, Frede has found her justification not 
in the Platonic text, but in her “wishful thinking” that Plato should have thought that 
propositional pleasures are “intellectually most interesting since they concern the logical 
sense of truth and falsity” (1985, p. 177-8). Once more it is Giorgione’s distinction and 
the search for “the intimate connection” 29 that is at work backstage. As Frede said, 
Bernard Williams’ article “has inspired all interpretations that have been sympathetic to 
‘propositional pleasures’”(p.178 n. 49).  
Against this idea, Mooradian has already shown that Socrates is always talking 
about pleasures that come with false belief, not only in the crucial passage, 37e, when he 
provokes Protarchus’ reaction, but also in 38a (“the pleasures that come with true belief”) 
and 38b (“pleasures and pain often follow true and false belief”). There is no evidence in 
Platonic texts that can suggest that Plato is applying Giorgione’s distinction. Gosling has 
insisted on this since the beginning of the controversy: “The vocabulary [of the 
passage]... is appropriated to the description of simple anticipatory enjoyment but 
inappropriate to the description of simply being pleased.” (1982, p. 441) Yet 
Propositionalists defend their position with the enthusiasm of Ryle fighting against 
Cartesian dualism. And their defense sounds like a threat: if you “reject this conception of 
pleasure [propositional pleasure]”, says Frede, you are going to “take up the cudgel, once 
                                                                                                                                            
210). 
28 See p. xlvii: “Had he taken such a direct route, Protarchus would not have understood 
him”…  
29 “This is what Socrates now attacks by establishing an intimate connection between pleasure 
and judgment.”, Frede (1993), n. 1, p. 41.  
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again, for Protarchus’ initial tenet that pleasures are mere feelings.” (p. xviii). The threat 
implicit in Frede’s hypothesis might intimidate Ryle’s followers, but it ought not 
intimidate Plato´s readers. For the threat depends on a decision about the meaning of 
Protarchus’ position. This is “the central interpretative problem” for Dybikowski, who 
rightly pointed out that we have to know “how does Socrates persuade Protarchus” after 
“his claim (...) that falsity is only properly attributed to the belief, but not the pleasure” 
(p. 157). If the conversion of Protarchus “remains a puzzle”30 until now, it is because 
commentators have failed to understand Protarchus’ position.  
Let’s take a look at another one of Frede’s problems: “Every interpreter must ask 
himself (and most actually have) why Socrates ruins his own analogy and does not claim 
that at least in a derivative sense one can maintain a distinction between true and false 
pleasures” (1985, p. 166). The possibility never admitted by Frede is that the analogy 
could not have this demonstrative character. In other words, Socrates could not be trying 
to show that doxa is an element that constitutes pleasure; he is only trying to extract from 
this comparison the asymmetric result that belief cannot explain pleasure. Frede 
understands the asymmetry as a sign that Socrates is looking for more than this, i.e., the 
intimate connection. “If Socrates undermines his own analogy,” she says, “this must 
indicate that he himself is not satisfied with it but wants to establish the truth or falsity of 
pleasure in the primary sense” (p. 167). But the question persists, as Mooradian has 
pointed out: “Why should Socrates describe his position in such a way as to maintain a 
distinction between pleasure and judgment if his goal is to identify pleasure with 
judgment or objects of judgment?” (p. 101, n. 16). We know Frede’s answer: 
psychological reasons.  
For Propositionalists, as we have said, Protarchus is an epiphenomenalist, but 
does the Platonic text support this idea? Following Gosling, they think that what 
Protarchus is trying to say is that pleasure is “an indistinct feeling of euphoria or elation 
that can arise on any occasion, an epiphenomenon” (1985, p. 172). As an 
epiphenomenalist, Protarchus wouldn’t be persuaded by the analogy between pleasure 
and belief. He would say, as he does at 37a, that he doubts that pleasure can be mistaken 
(hamartesetai) in relation to his its object as doxa does, because pleasure would be a mere 
                                                
30 Mooradian (1996), p. 93. 
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epiphenomenon, i.e., only loosely connected with belief. Thalberg’s image of the 
“melting of a piece of wax and the heating that preceded it” gave the model to future 
interpreters. 31 Commentators, modeling their views on Thalberg’s metaphor, tend to see 
in Protarchus an expression of a Humean view that pleasures are not the sort of mental 
states that can represent states of things. 32 Against this view, and against Gosling, the 
inventor of the topic of false pleasures in contemporary terms, Kenny (p. 46) had already 
noted that “Protarchus never denies that pleasure can be true, he only denies that they can 
be false.”33 Therefore, Protarchus can’t be an epiphenomenalist, but should be defending 
a different view. But, if Socrates is not fighting against epiphenomenalism, which view is 
the target?  
The more plausible hypothesis was defended by Mooradian 34. He suggests that 
Protarchus is expressing the same view of aisthesis presented in the first part of 
Theaetetus: Pleasure cannot be false because it is a kind of aesthesis, and aisthesis is 
always correct in relation to its object. In fact, there is a “striking similarity,” as he says, 
between the description of pleasures and pains, desires, and fears as incorrigible states of 
awareness (aisthesis) and Protarchus’ claim that only belief can be false, not pleasures 
and pains, fears and expectations. Mooradian pointed out that “commentators have failed 
to notice this similarity because they have thought Socrates meant to signal other 
propositional attitudes by including fears and expectations into the range of possible false 
mental states. But this assumption is unwarranted.”35 Mooradian’s more attractive and 
Platonic alternative is to assume “that Protarchus held that pleasure cannot be true or false 
because it is not a representational state”, that we could see him “as advancing the 
relativistic thesis of Theaetetus that the object cannot fail to be pleasurable if the agent 
takes pleasure in it”.  
                                                
31 Thalberg, p. 67  
32 For the attribution of a Humean view to Protarchus, see Mooradian (1996).  
33 Mooradian (p. 94)  
34 One important point about Protarchus, linked to the Epiphenomenalist thesis, is that 
Propositionalists think that he is commonsensical person, expressing a naïve conception, a 
spontaneous view. But, on the contrary, Protarchus seems to be defending a theoretical point of 
view (even though he wasn’t the most competent man to defend it). When Protarchus replies 
that he is only saying what he hears (38a), this is a strong indication that Protarchus is 
expressing the philosophical thesis that Plato means to develop and criticizes”.  
35 Mooradian (1996), 105-6. 
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Mooradian’s alternative thesis is behind two recent and important attempts to 
escape from the aporia of Giorgione´s distinction. Verity Harte says (p.120 n. 6) that her 
conclusion is “similar to Mooradian although we differ over how [Socrates] gets there.” 
But she still agrees “with those commentators who take Socrates to portray the pleasures 
he takes to be capable of falsity as propositional attitudes” (p. 120). Harte knows very 
well that it is difficult to defend the “generally held” view that Socrates’ false pleasure is 
of William’s type (“pleasure is false –it is generally held–when expectations of acquiring 
the gold are not fulfilled” p. 124). And she correctly thinks that images “should not be 
identified with attitudes,” but to keep the propositional law working, she assumes that 
“logoi and images are involved in our having such attitudes” [my italics]. Unfortunately, 
she doesn’t explain what this involvement is exactly. As Dybikovski says, all we want to 
know is how we go from the logoi to the pictures, or how we pass from belief to affect, 
from “proposition” to pleasures. Harte’s solution to the central question of Giorgione 
seems to follow Gosling’s rejected suggestion of precognition. For Harte, in Socrates’ 
example, what is depicted is the anticipated pleasure, but in the sense that it is the 
pleasure of which the anticipatory pleasure takes an advance installment of the pleasure 
depicted (p. 127). It is not a pleasure “in picturing,” but “by picturing.” But why is it 
false? Harte is aware of the problem: “If falsity consists in the failure of the person’s 
prediction (...) then Socrates will claim (...) that good people are by and large accurate. 
Whereas bad people (...) [are] not. But it is not at all obvious why this should be the 
case,” Harte recognizes (p. 127). The second attempt goes a bit further. Delcomminette 
recognizes that the conception of a propositional pleasure begins with Bernard Williams 
(“L’initiateur de cette conception est Williams (1959)”). And, in a certain way, he seems 
to have learned Gosling’s lessons, because he says that if we try to understand the 
pleasure of anticipation on the level of doxa and logos, as the majority of Anglo-Saxon 
commentators. “...on ne comprendrait guère pourquoi Socrates aurait pris la peine de 
nous décrier le fonctionement de l’imagination.” But at the same time Delcomminette 
accepted the propositional dogma, and his interpretation is also trapped by Giorgione 
distinction. 36  
                                                
36 Delcomminete (2006), p. 385. He recognizes the majority of Anglo-Saxon commentators 
“voyant en Platon le père d’une conception du plaisir comme ‘attitude propositionnelle’.” He 
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Two important but neglected passages in the text show the limitations of the 
Propositionalist thesis:  
 A: “There are, above all, painted appearances. For example, when somebody often 
sees gold in profusion coming to him, and with the gold multiple pleasures; and, 
particularly, when he watches himself in the painting enjoying himself excessively.” 
(40a9-12)  
 B: Socrates says we could “affirm that the paintings presented to good people, in the 
majority of cases, are true, because good people are dear to the gods, but the paintings 
presented to bad people are exactly the opposite?” Protarchus: “Certainly we should 
say that.” Socrates: “There are painted pleasures in bad people no less [than in good 
people], although in bad people the paintings are false (...) Bad men most of the time 
enjoy false pleasures, good men, to the contrary, enjoy true pleasures.” Protarchus: 
“What you are saying is absolutely necessary.” (40b2-c2)  
The first passage, fundamental for understanding the position Socrates is trying to 
defend, is “the only typical case that Plato gives of the thing he has in mind,” as Gosling 
says in his first article. Inserted in the middle of argumentation of false pleasure, the 
                                                                                                                                            
accepts what Gosling said in his first account about the zoographos passage: It should not be 
read as “an embellishment, picturesque perhaps, but irrelevant, which complicates what was 
intended as a simple picture.” But as we have shown, it was exactly in trying to make sense of 
the zoographos passage that Gosling’s interpretation collapsed. Delcomminette, trying to 
understand the passage in the context of Platonic thought, found the same old Giorgione 
obstacle: “Mais comment passer de cette fausseté du plasir anticipé à la fausseté du plaisir 
d´anticipation lui-même? Socrate n´explicite pas cette transition: Il se contente d´attribuer la 
possibilité de la fausseté au plaisir paint (cp. 40b6-7).” Delcomminette recognizes the problem: 
“On pourrait rétorquer que c´est bien plutôt cette distinction qui est erronée: en effect le plaisir 
d´anticipation n´est rien d´autre que l´anticipation d´un plaisir.” (2006, p. 389-390). 
Delcomminette can’t follow this line of thought because he is committed to the idea that the 
question of falsity is directly linked to the “propositional content” of doxa (v. 2003, p. 217) and 
“la dépendence causale de la fausseté de l’image à l’égard de celle de la doxa (2006, 362 n.23). 
And so we are taken back to the Gorgione aporia. Against Mooradian and the idea that 
Protarchus is defending a Protagorean thesis, Delcomminette says that appearance is essentially 
different from mere perception since it supposes that perception is “mixed,” that is to say, 
structured by doxa. But strangely, he assumes that at Theaethetus 152b12 an identity between 
phainetai and aisthanetai is posited, which becomes at 152c1 an identity between phantasia 
and aisthesis. Now, Delcomminette accepts that “this identity results from Protagoras’ position 
and can in no way be ascribed to Plato himself” (n.17 223). So it is not clear why 
Delcomminette thinks that Protarchus could not be defending exactly this Protagorean 
identification.  
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second passage is of the theophileis, and commentators, in general, don’t have “a word to 
say about it.” 37 In relation to A, it is curious that Propositionalists, always so worried to 
save Plato from attributed confusions and conflations, don’t have any charitable account 
of his typical case. Instead of paying attention to it, they prefer to create their own cases 
of the pleasure of anticipation. “I am looking forward to my Mediterranean holiday,” 
dreams Gosling, “I picture myself enjoying a long drink under a beach umbrella, and 
enjoy the picture.”38 But why have commentators insisted on imagining their own typical 
cases?39 Frede explains: “Plato’s own example is difficult to evaluate since it is not prima 
facie clear what, precisely, are the pleasures of the man who sees the painted illusions of 
possessing a lot of gold and many pleasures on account of that (40a).” In other words, 
there are no logoi implied in the pleasure described by Socrates. And, as Plato’s example 
here is not clear for the purpose of Frede’s theory, she decided to “suggest a different 
example, where logoi are clearly implied, namely that of Rumpelstiltskin in the Grimm 
Tale” (p. 171). Obviously, Frede is forcing the Platonic text to say what she is expecting 
to hear by means of her example. Kenny imagines another kind of pleasure. In this 
situation “a man might foresee that he will win 70,000 pounds from a football pool; and 
being a selfish man he might anticipate spending the entire sum on beer.”40 Thalberg, as 
we have seen, pictures himself as a sweepstakes winner, Penner in a skating race, but 
Russell prefers speedy cars and asks the reader: “Suppose that I set my heart on owning a 
Jaguar, dreaming of the thrill of speeding along being the envy of my neighbors and 
friends” (p. 179). In summary, we have a whole world of painted pleasures anticipated by 
interpreters and commentators created just to explain what they can’t find their 
presuppositions in the Platonic typical case.41 It seems easier for them to talk about their 
                                                
37 Delcomminette (2003), 216 n. 2: “In this paper I shall focus on the epistemological aspect of 
the concept of false pleasure and deliberately ignore the ethical significance (hence I shall not 
say a single word about the puzzling passage 39e8-40c3).”  
38 GT, p. 436. 
39 Teisserenc (p.290) has called attention to this process: “Penner préfère consacrer la première 
moitié de son article à la discussion d’exemples de son cru” et … Frede, “Rumplestiltskin’s” 
emprunte à Grimm (…) Ce faisant, ils commentent davantage leur proper conception que celle 
de Platon.”  
40 Kenny (1960), p. 37.  
41 Commentators have disagreed about their own examples. Thus Frede thinks that Gosling’s 
example (of the excited schoolboy who [falsely] enjoys the food (...) while what he enjoys is 
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examples, and we may have an impertinent question to ask: Could an interpreter falsify a 
theory by forging inaccurate examples? 42  
Let´s take a look at the rejected example.  
In 40a, Protarchus agrees that every man is full of many expectations and that 
there are in us logoi that we call expectations, and Socrates adds:  
There are, above all (kai de kai), painted appearances (ta phantasmata ezographemena). 
For example, when somebody often sees (hora) gold in profusion (aphthonon) coming to 
him, and with the gold multiple (pollas) pleasures; and, particularly (kai de kai), when he 
watches (kathora) himself in the painting enjoying himself excessively (sphodra).  
 
The example is evidently centered in direct visualization of the painting. And 
there is a clear change of focus from the logoi to the phantasma introduced by the 
adverbial expression “kai de kai.” In the soul there are logoi that we call expectations, 
and also painted phantasmata (appearances). The present indicative verb hora, he sees, in 
relation to a phantasma seen, recreates the situation of perception similar to that 
described in 38d (when somebody frequently sees (idonti) an apparition 
(phantazomenon). The two parallel situations give us the key to understand the example. 
The similarity has, nonetheless, one fundamental asymmetry. In the external visualization 
of the phantasma, the appearance is not clear (me saphos) giving space for an attempt to 
discern what the appearance is. The doxa results from this effort, and logos makes it 
possible to express the doxa. In the internal visualization, on the other hand, the painted 
appearance doesn’t provoke any doubt43 and comes after a logos that in turn results from 
a conjunction of memory, perception (aisthesis) and associated feelings (pathemata). 
This internal experience of anticipatory pleasure has as a model the external experience 
of perception. This fact rules out any attempt to transform the introspection of the painted 
phantasma into a “being pleased that” or any kind of propositional attitude. In her effort 
                                                                                                                                            
the adventure) should be changed: e.g., the schoolboy falsely enjoys “eating up the 
headmaster´s favorite dessert” (falsely, because it is not the favorite dessert…). Frede (1985), 
p. 171 n. 39  
42 Teisserenc (1999), p. 290, n. 2. 
43 Teisserenc (1999), p. 290, has pointed out this aspect of the painted pleasure: “elle [la image 
psychique] représente le plaisir au moyen d´expresssions et de signes dépourvue de toute 
ambiguïté: l’homme qui s´aperçoit lui-même n´a pas de doute sur la signification de son 
visage et de sa conduit…” 
 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy  
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga 
 
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.8, n.1. p. 49-75, 2014. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v8i1p549-75 
 
 71 
to make plausible the idea of propositional pleasure, Frede says (“To placate the 
skeptics”...) that she has to admit that “only such pleasures can be true or false where 
there is a clear and precise proposition or a clear or precise picture of the supposed facts” 
(p. 175). It would be very difficult to placate the skeptics with this admission since there 
is “no clear and precise proposition” or supposed “facts” to be pictured in the example. 
For Plato’s readers, it becomes clear that Socrates’ example was replaced by Frede (and 
the others Propositionalists) only because Plato’s example didn’t fit in the pattern of 
propositional pleasure.  
To understand the function of logoi in the structure of the introspection passage, 
we should understand it in relation to the corresponding example of external perception 
(38c5-e7). Externally, logos appear as the last link in a chained series: vision – 
phantasma – belief – logos (spoken). In the internal series (that gives continuity to the 
external in the reversed form) we have: (aisthesis + memory + pathemata) – logoi 
(written) – belief – phantasma – vision. They are mirror images. But logoi, as the text 
shows, are products of a stochastic activity: its truth or falsity depends on chance (if it 
hits the mark); there is no rational justification for these logoi as true or false logoi, 
although by hypothesis we can suppose this possibility. But why do logoi come in first 
place, before images, in the internal series? We know that in external perception logoi 
come from the phantasmata, after a process of decision; in the internal perception, on the 
other hand, there is no room for rational or stochastic decision. The soul is submitted to 
the writings and images that come from the outside, from the sensible world. All logoi are 
written by aisthesis and memory (which is mere conservation of aisthesis) and pathemata 
(affections). If we have only this kind of writings, they are the conditions of possibility of 
all mental writings and images. If this is so, it is clear that we are all full of empty hopes 
that came from our relation with the uncertainty of the world outside.  
The second passage neglected by Propositionalists but essential to the argument of 
falsity of pleasures of anticipation is the following:  
Socrates asks Protarchus, in the sequence of the argument, if we could “affirm that 
the paintings presented to good people, in the majority of cases, are true, because good 
people are dear to the gods (theophileis), but the paintings presented to bad people are 
exactly the opposite?” Protarchus emphatically says “Certainly we should say that.” 
Socrates concludes that “there are painted pleasures in bad people no less [than in good 
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people], although in bad people the paintings are false.” And he adds, “bad men most of 
the time enjoy false pleasures, good men, to the contrary, enjoy true pleasures”. Once 
more, Protarchus is convinced: “What you are saying is absolutely necessary.” Then 
Socrates and Protarchus agree that “there are false pleasures and pains in the soul of men 
that are ridiculous imitations of the true.” Protarchus’ agreement depends on the 
assumption that the men who are dear to the gods tend to have true paintings or writings 
while bad men tend to have false paintings or writings. This is one of the premises 
leading Protarchus to accept the existence of false pleasures (false pleasures “that are 
ridiculous imitations of the true”).  
As we can see, the premise of the theophileis is essential for the conversion of 
Protarchus, but what do Propositionalists say about it? A good example is 
Delcomminette. He says “I shall not say a single word about the puzzling passage 39e8-
40c3.” (p. 216 n. 2). His reason is predictable: “the epistemological aspect,” he says, “can 
be understood relatively independent of the rest.” But we can’t see how a successful 
interpretation of the argument can ignore one premise as unnecessary. Likewise Frede 
doesn’t discuss it probably because she thinks with Gosling that the theophileis passage is 
a “moralistic digression” (p. 111)44.  
One of the few interpreters that face the “unexpected remark” with some attention 
is Kenny (p. 50): “Bad men, then, enjoy largely false pleasures, while good men enjoy 
true ones. Hence we conclude that there are false pleasures in the minds of men,” he says 
and asks, “Why this reference to the wicked man?” He correctly sees that we have to 
decide about the meaning of false to understand what a false doxa is. If it is a “false belief 
that an event will take place” (in the case of the example of a “man looking forward to 
receiving a fortune”), we have to answer: “why should the good man be more likely to be 
correct in his belief than the wicked man...” Kenny’s striking observations didn’t have 
any effect on the Propositionalists’ analyses. In fact, to assume a propositionalistic view 
is to decide about the meaning of truth as representational, as mere grasp of facts. But, as 
we can see in the passage, truth and false is simultaneously epistemic, ethical and 
ontological45. The mention to the mimetic context (phantasma, mimeisthai, etc) indicates 
                                                
44 Gosling’ Philebus.  
45 See Hampton (1987, p. 257): “But, for Plato, truth and false are ethical as well as epistemic 
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that we are stepping on ontological ground when the false pleasures are discussed. So, if 
the discussion of false pleasures demands for an interpretation that connects the 
epistemic, the ethical and ontological sense of truth, Propositionalism is not a good 
candidate for this.  
 
Conclusion:  
From our exposition, I think that is clear that the Propositional Interpretation of 
false anticipatory pleasures in Philebus (i) does not have a textual basis, (ii) doesn’t 
answer the fundamental ethical questions raised by the dialogue, and finally (iii) is not 
necessary to understand the passage but is an anachronism obstructing a sound reading of 
the Platonic text. And we can suggest that any good interpretation of the passage of false 
pleasure should explain false anticipatory pleasure as a function of the typical example 
that the text offers; should take the theophileis passage not as a digression, but as an 
integral part of the argument; and should show how it (false pleasure of anticipation) is 
related to the global strategy of the dialogue and, doing this, answer why it is decisive to 
the final judgment of the dialogue. In relation to the last point, it is important to 
remember that in 32c, when the question of anticipation (prosdokia) is introduced by 
Socrates, he says that it is in relation to this kind of pleasure and pain that the central 
question of the dialogue is going to be answered: if the genus pleasure will be welcome 
as a whole, or sometimes yes, sometimes not. And he adds: “Pleasure and pain--such as 
hot and cold, etc.--are not good in themselves but can take on in certain circumstances the 
nature of the good.” This is evidence that, since the beginning of Socrates’ exposition of 
false anticipatory pleasure, ethical and metaphysical aspects of pleasure are related and 
projected in the passage.  
 
Fernando Muniz 
Universidade Federal Fluminense 
 
                                                                                                                                            
notions and both are grounded on an ontological sense (...) For it is the idea of the falseness of 
an inadequate imitation that suggests how the pleasure of the would-be rich man is false (...) 
The good man is good in the sense of being just and pious and thus is called “a friend of the 
gods”.” 
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